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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 78-2(A)(3)(i) of the
Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether

the

trial

court

abused

its

discretion

or

committed manifest injustice in refusing to order that the increase
in child support be retroactive prior to October 15, 1991 despite
the fact that prior to October 15, 1991 there was no substantial
change in circumstances as defined by the Uniform Civil Liability
for Support Act.
2.

Whether

the

trial

court

abused

its

discretion

or

committed manifest injustice in failing to modify the Decree of
Divorce so as to switch the dependency exemption for the parties'
minor child from the Appellee to the Appellant when based on the
stipulated facts there was no change in the circumstances upon
which the Decree of Divorce was based.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As all of the evidence was presented to the court by way of
stipulation, the standard of review is whether the lower court
abused its discretion or committed manifest injustice. Fullmer v.
Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988), Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d
624 (Utah 1987).

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The statutory provisions determinative in this action are:
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(3) (1953 as amended).
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of
the parties, the custody of the children and their
support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the
distribution of property as is reasonable and necessary.
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-10.6(2) (1953 as amended).
A child or spousal support payment under a child support
order may be modified with respect to any period during
which a petition for modification is pending, but only
from the date notice of that is the petitioner, or to the
obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2(6)
With regard to child support orders, enactment of the
guidelines and any subsequent change in the guidelines
constitutes a substantial or material change of circumstances
as a ground for modification of a court order, if there is a
difference of at least 25% between the existing order and the
guidelines...
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2(2)(a) and (b)
The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable
presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of
temporary or permanent child support.
The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and
considerations required by the guidelines and the award
amounts resulting from the application of the guidelines are
presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the provisions
of this section.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2(3)
A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting
the conclusion that complying with a provision of the
guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from use of
2

the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the
best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to
rebut the presumption in that case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Mature of the Case.
This appeal requests a review of the lower court's ruling on

the Appellant's Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce and
Amended Petition to Modify.
II.

Course of Proceedings.
On or about April 22, 1991 the Appellee was served with the

Appellant's Petition to Modify Decree.

On or about May 19, 1992

the Appellant served her Supplemental Petition to Modify.

On

September 3, 1992 Appellant's Petition to Modify and Supplemental
Petition came on for trial. At the trial, the parties stipulated
to all but two (2) issues.

The stipulated issues included an

increase in the appellee's monthly child support obligation from
$250.00 to $322.00.

The two issues that were submitted to the

court were (1) the date to which the increase in child support
should be retroactively applied, and (2) whether the Decree of
Divorce should be modified so as to transfer the dependency
exemption for the parties' minor child from the Appellee to the
Appellant. Evidence on these issues was submitted by proffer. The
parties stipulated to the truth and correctness of the proffered
facts.

Based on the stipulated facts, the court ordered that the
3

Appellee's increase in child support should be retroactive to
October 15, 1991, and that there was not a substantial change in
circumstances upon which to modify the Decree of Divorce so as to
switch the dependency exemption from the Appellee to the Appellant.
III.

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for
Review.
On April 22, 1991 the Appellant served the Appellee with her

Petition to Modify. The Petition requested (a) that the Decree of
Divorce be modified to increase the Appellant's child support
obligation

in

an

amount

consistent

with

the

Child

Support

Guidelines, and (2) that the Appellant obtain life insurance on his
life in the sum of at least $100,000 with the parties' minor child
named as the beneficiary and the Appellant as the Trustee.
In support of the Petition to Modify, the Appellant alleged
three (3) changes in circumstances: (a) that the Appellee had moved
to New York; (b) that the Appellee's earnings had substantially
increased; and (c) that the cost of raising the parties' minor
child had substantially increased.
On May 19, 1992 the Appellant served the Appellee with the
Supplemental Petition to Modify.

The Supplemental Petition to

Modify requested that the Decree of Divorce be modified so as to
switch the tax dependency exemption for the parties' minor child
from the Appellee to the Appellant.
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time of the Decree of Divorce, to-wit, that at the Lime of the
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Decree

the

Appellee

was

a

full-time

college

student

and

the

Appellant was working full-time (Paragraph 1, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Addendum B ) ;
(b) that the Decree of Divorce provided that from 1986
through 1989 the Appellant would claim the dependency exemption for
the parties' minor child, and that from 1990 on the Appellee would
claim the minor child as a dependency exemption

(Paragraph

6,

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law);
(c)

that the circumstances upon which the court granted

the dependency exemption to the Appellant through 1989 and to the
Appellee from 1990 forward were that at the time of the Decree the
Appellee was a full-time college student, that at the time of the
Decree the Appellant was working full-time, that at the time of the
Decree of Divorce the parties anticipated that in 1990 the Appellee
would have obtained employment and would be earning more than the
Appellant and would have greater use for the dependency exemption
(Paragraphs 1, 2 and 6, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law);
(d)

the gross monthly incomes of the Appellant and the

Appellee as of April 22, 1991, the date Appellant was served with
the Petition to Modify (Paragraph 9, Findings of Fact);
(e)

that the Guideline amount that existed on the date

the Appellee was served with the Petition to Modify
1991) was $295.00 (Paragraph 10, Findings of Fact);
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reconsider and increase child support" (Paragraph 13, Findings of
Fact).
On the issue of retroactivity, the court concluded:
(a)

that

the

increase

in

child

support

should

be

retroactive to October 15, 1991, as of that date there was greater
than a 25% difference between the Guideline amount and the thenexisting order (Paragraphs 3 and 5, Conclusions of Law);
(b)

that the increase in child support should not be

retroactive to April 22, 1991, as of that date there was not a 25%
difference between the existing order and the Guideline amount
(Paragraph 5, Conclusions of Law);
On the tax dependency exemption issue, the court concluded
that
"there has not been a substantial change in circumstances
of the parties sufficient to warrant altering the portion
of the existing Decree which awards the plaintiff the
right to claim the minor child of the parties as a
dependent and thus claim an exemption for income tax
purposes." (Paragraph 8, Conclusions of Law).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant raises two

(2) issues in her brief.

These

issues are (1) that the lower court erred in ordering that the
Appellee's

increase

in child support should be retroactive to

October 15, 1991 as opposed to April 22, 1991; and (2) that the
lower court erred in not modifying the Decree of Divorce so as to

8

switch the tax dependency exemption for the parties' minor child
from the Appellee to the Appellant.
On the retroactivity issue, the Appellant makes three (3)
points.

The first point is that the trial court did not make

adequate findings to support its conclusion that the increase would
not be retroactive to April 22, 1991, as of that date there was not
a substantial change in circumstance.

The Appellee argues that a

Decree of Divorce can only be modified when there is a substantial
change in circumstances. According to the Uniform Civil Liability
for Support Act, a change in circumstance exists so as to modify
child support when there is a difference of at least 25% between
the existing order and the Guideline amount.

The trial court

concluded that the order would not be retroactive to April 22,
1991, as of that date there was not a 25% difference between the
Guideline amount and the existing order.

The trial court ordered

that the modification be retroactive to October 15, 1991, as of
that date there was at least a 25% difference between the Guideline
amount and the existing order.

The Appellant's assertions aside,

the court's conclusion was amply supported by findings which
detailed the parties' incomes as of both April 22, 1991 and October
15, 1991, the Guideline amounts that existed on those dates as well
as the fact that on April 22, 1991 there was less than a 25%
difference between the existing order and Guideline amount, and the
9

fact that on October 15, 1991 there was at least a 25% difference
between the Guideline amount and the existing order.
The Appellant argues that despite the fact that on April 22,
1991 there was less than a 25% difference between the Guideline
amount and the existing order, the court had the authority to make
the order retroactive to April 22, 1991.

The presumption of the

Uniform Civil Liability Act, that a change in circumstance exists
when there is at least a 25% difference between the existing order
and the Guideline amount, may be rebutted when the court determines
that applying the Guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate or not
in the child's best

interest.

As the Appellant

introduced

absolutely no evidence to rebut the Guideline's presumption of
correctness, the Appellant cannot now claim that the court erred in
failing to divert from the Guidelines.
The Appellant also claims that the stipulated facts that the
Appellant's salary decreased, the Appellee's salary increased, and
that the cost of caring for Alison increased, the court should have
made the order retroactive to April 22, 1991. These facts are not
sufficient to rebut the Guideline's presumption of correctness.
The increases and decreases in the parties' incomes are what
established the existence of a substantial change in circumstances
as of October 15, 1991. These same facts indicated no substantial
change in circumstances as of April 22, 1991.
10

As the parties'

salaries did not create a change in circumstance on April 22, 1991,
it could hardly be argued that these same factors rebut the
Guideline's presumption of correctness.

The fact that costs for

caring for Alison may have increased does not by itself, without
any evidence as to the extent of these increases, rebut the
Guideline's presumption of correctness.
The second issue raised by the appeal is whether the court
erred in failing to find that no change in circumstance existed
upon which to modify the Decree of Divorce so as to switch the
dependency exemption from the Appellee to the Appellant.
As the circumstances upon which the Decree of Divorce awarded
the Appellant the dependency exemption through tax year 1989 and
then to the Appellee from 1990 forward were that from the date of
the Decree through 1989 it was anticipated that the Appellant would
earning more than the Appellee, and that from 1990 forward, the
Appellee would be earning more than the Appellant, and as there has
been no change in those circumstances, the court was correct in
finding that there was no change in circumstances sufficient to
modify the Decree of Divorce so as to switch the tax dependency
exemption from the Appellee to the Appellant.

11

ARGUMENT
I*

The Lower Court Properly Ruled That the Increase in Child
Support Should Be Retroactive to the Date There Was At Least
a 25% Difference Between the Guideline Amount and the ThenExisting Order.
The Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce was served on the

Appellee on April 22, 1991.

On that date, there was less than a

25% difference between the existing order and the Guideline amount.
On October 15, 1991 the Appellee received a raise.

As of October

15, 1991, there was more than a 25% difference between the existing
order and Guideline amount. At trial, the Appellee argued that the
increase in child support should be retroactive to October 15,
1991.

The Appellant argued that the increase should be retroactive

to the date the Appellee was served with the Petition to Modify,
April

22, 1991.

The court ruled that the

retroactive to October 15, 1991.

increase would

be

In her brief, the Appellant

claims that:
(1)

The court failed to make adequate findings;

(2)

The court had the authority to make the increase

retroactive to April 22, 1991 (even though as of that date there
was not a difference of at least 25% between the existing order and
the Guideline amount); and
(3)

Based on the stipulated facts, the court should have

made the increase retroactive to April 22, 1991.

12

A.
The Trial Court Made Adequate Findings for Its
Decision That the Increase in Child Support Should Be
Retroactive Only to the Date When There Was a 25% Difference
Between the Existing Order and Guideline Amount.
The Appellant cites Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App.
1990) for the proposition that when modifying child support, the
trial court must make specific findings on all the statutory
factors, including the needs of the child and the parents' ability
to pay.

The Appellant fails to realize that although Ostler was

decided in 1990, the Court based its decision on pre-Child Support
Guideline law. Since the adoption of the Guidelines, the courts do
not need to consider the factors set forth in Ostler, including:
"the standard of living and situations of the
parties...the relative wealth and income of
the parties...the ability of the obligor to
earn..." Id. at 715.
As Ostler was decided on pre-Guideline law, in the instant
case it was not necessary that the trial court make findings on the
factors set forth in Ostler.
As the Appellant claims that the trial court did not made
adequate findings to support its conclusions, it is first necessary
to review the trial court's conclusions.

In paragraph 3 of the

Conclusions of Law, the court concluded that as of October 15, 1991
there was a 25% increase between the existing order and the
Guideline

amount,

the

plaintiff's

increased:
13

child

support

should

be

"Under the statutory guidelines based upon the
parties7 current incomes and incomes as of
October 15, 1991, plaintiff's child support
obligation has increased by more than twentyfive percent
(25%) over his obligation
provided in the existing order. Pursuant to
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(6) (1953 as amended)
in light of that twenty-five percent (25%)
increase, the plaintiff's child support
obligation should be increased to the sum of
three hundred twenty-two dollars ($322.00) per
month." Conclusions of Law, p. 7.
In paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of Law, the court concluded
that as the plaintiff's
$3,081.00

increase in gross monthly

salary to

(the amount that made a greater than 25% difference

between the Guidelines and the existing order) occurred on October
15, 1991, the order should be retroactive to that date:
"Because the increase in plaintiff's salary to
three thousand eighty-one dollars ($3,081.00)
gross per month occurred on October 15, 1991,
the increase in plaintiff's child support
obligation should be retroactive, pursuant to
Ut.

Code

Ann.

§

30-3-10.6

amended),
only
to
October
Conclusions of Law, p. 8.

(2)

(1953

15,

as

1991.

In paragraph 6, the court concluded that as of April 22, 1991
there was not a 25% difference between the existing order and the
Guideline amount, the increase in child support should not be
retroactive to April 22, 1991, but only to October 15, 1991:
"The child support shall not be retroactive to
when the plaintiff was served with the
Petition for Modification (April 22, 1991)
because as of that date based upon the
parties' respective incomes at that time the
increase in child support under the guidelines
14

was less than one hundred twenty-five percent
(<125%) of plaintiffs support obligation
under the existing order."
Conclusions of
Law, paragraph 6.
Pared to the bare essentials, the three (3) cited provisions
of the Conclusions of Law are that as of October 15, 1991, as there
was a 25% difference between the existing order the Guideline
amount, the increase in child support would be retroactive to that
date. As there was not a 25% difference between the existing order
and the Guideline amount until October 15, 1991, the increase in
child support would not be retroactive prior to October 15, 1991.
According to the decision in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d
199 (Utah App. 1987) the above conclusions are adequately supported
when the findings:
"(1) are sufficiently detailed, (2) include
enough facts to disclose the process through
which the ultimate conclusion is reached, (3)
indicate the process is logical and properly
supported, and (4) are not clearly erroneous."
Id. at 203.
Applying the Marchant decision to the instant case, the trial
court's conclusion that the increase in child support would not be
retroactive prior to October 15 ,1991 as prior to that date there
was less than a 25% difference between the existing order and the
guideline amount, the findings in the instant case are sufficient
if they set forth the gross monthly incomes of the parties as of
October 15, 1991 and as of April 22, 1991, a computation of
15

Guideline amounts as of those dates, and whether there was a 25%
difference between the existing order and the Guideline amount.
The Findings of Fact in the instant case contain this information
and more.

The Findings that touch on the issue of retroactivity

are paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the Findings of Fact.

Paragraph 9

sets forth the parties' gross monthly incomes as of April of 1991:
"In April, 1991 plaintiff was earning only two
thousand eight hundred fifty-two dollars
($2,852.00) gross monthly salary working for
IBM. In April, 1991 defendant was earning one
thousand eight hundred seventy-three dollars
$1,873.00) gross per month working full-time
as a school teacher." Findings of Fact, p. 4.
Paragraph 10 states that the income as of April 22, 1991 did
not constitute a 25% difference between the existing order and
amount under the Guidelines:
"Under the statutory support guidelines, in
April,
1991, plaintiff's
child
support
obligation to the defendant, if then recalculated, would have been two hundred
ninety-five dollars ($295.00) per month. Said
sum represents less than a twenty-five percent
(25%)
increase
in
plaintiff's
support
obligation under the guidelines from the
existing court order ($250.00) in effect in
April 1991." Findings of Fact, p. 4.
Paragraph 11 recites the Appellee's raise to $3,081.00 per
month:
"On or about October 15, 1991, the plaintiff
received an increase in his monthly gross
income and since that date has been earning
three thousand eighty-one dollars ($3,081.00)
gross per month. Findings of Fact, p. 4.
16

As these Findings completely set forth the parties' incomes as
of April and October of 1991, as they state that there was not a
25% difference between the existing order and the Guideline amount
as of April of 1991, and as they set forth the plaintiff's increase
of income of October of 1991, the Findings sufficiently detail and
disclose the process through which the court concluded that the
increase should be retroactive to October of 1991. As is required
by Marchant. that process is logical, properly supported, and not
erroneous.

Quite simply, the court made the increase retroactive

to the date on which there was a 25% difference between the
existing order and the Guideline amount, and no further.
B.
The Appellant Failed to Produce Any Evidence To
Overcome
the
Guidelines'
Rebuttable
Presumption
of
Correctness.
In Point 1(b) of her Brief, the Appellant argues that although
a 25% difference between the existing order and the new Guideline
amount may be a sufficient basis to modify a support order, a 25%
difference is not necessary for a modification. The Appellant then
goes on to state that:
"A trial court can modify an existing order
when
it
finds
a
material
change
of
circumstances independent of the impact of the
Guidelines.M
In a way, the Appellant is correct.

A court can modify a

support order even if there is less than a 25% difference between
the existing order and the Guideline amount. It is also true that
17

"a decree can only be modified when there is a substantial change
in circumstances upon which the order is based." Haslam v. Haslam,
657 P.2d 757.
As

is

stated

in

§

78-45-7.3,

substantial

and/or

material

Utah

change

in

Code

Annotated,

circumstance

a

exists

sufficient to modify child support where there is "a difference of
at least 25% between the existing order and the guidelines."
25% level is not an absolute.
guidelines

should

be

The

§ 78-45-7.2(a) states that "...the

applied

as

a

rebuttable

presumption

in...modifying the amount of...permanent child support."
Section 78-45-7.2(3) requires that when a court deviates from
the Guidelines, the court must provide specific findings why the
court reached:
"the conclusion that complying with a
provision of the guidelines or ordering an
award amount resulting from use of the
guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or
not in the best interest of a child in a
particular case is sufficient to rebut the
presumption in that case."
It follows that for a court to deviate from the Guidelines,
there

must

have

been

sufficient

evidence

that

applying

the

Guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate or not in the child's
best interest.

Other than the conclusory statement of Paragraph 4

of the Findings of Fact that the cost of caring for the child has
increased, the Appellant produced absolutely no evidence whatsoever
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upon which the trial court could conclude that applying the
Guidelines and making the order retroactive to October of 1991 was
somehow unjust, inappropriate, or did not follow the best interest
of the child.
In Christensen v. Christensen the Court stated:
"The burden rests with the party seeking
modification to show a substantial change in
circumstances
such
as
to
warrant
modification."
Christensen v. Christensen.
628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981).
The Appellant, having failed to produce any evidence (the
Appellant did not even attempt to introduce any such evidence) to
rebut the Guideline's presumption of correctness, the Appellant
cannot now claim that the trial court erred in failing to divert
from the Guidelines and make child support retroactive to April 22,
1991.
C
The Stipulated Facts Do Not Indicate That the Increase in
Child Support Should Be Retroactive to April of 1991.
The Appellant's third subpoint is that the stipulated facts
"indicate" that the increase in child support should be retroactive
to April 22, 1991.
The Appellant claims that three factors "unrelated to the
impact of the Guidelines were sufficient to establish a change in
circumstances."

The Appellant identifies these three factors as

"(1) a large increase in Mr. Blaine's salary,
(2) a decrease in Ms. Bradshaw's salary, and
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(3) an increase in the cost of caring for
Alison." Appellant Brief at 21.
The Appellant fails to realize, as has been set forth above,
that

however

large

the

Appellant

and

Appellee's

respective

increases and/or decreases in gross monthly incomes may have been,
there is no substantial change in circumstances unless there is
greater than a 25% difference between the existing order and the
Guideline amount. As on April 22, 1991 the difference between the
existing order and the Guideline amount was less than 25%, a
substantial change in circumstances upon which to make the increase
in child support retroactive did not exist on that date.
The

third

stipulated

fact

that

the

Appellant

claims

"indicated" that the increase in child support should have been
retroactive to April 22, 1991 was "an increase in the cost of
caring for Alison." In accordance with Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act, the requirement of a 25% difference between the
Guideline amount and the existing order is a rebuttable presumption
of a change in circumstances.

The presumption may be rebutted by

evidence that convinces the court that applying the Guidelines
would be unfair, unjust or not in the child's best interest.

The

parties did stipulate, as is set forth in Paragraph 4 of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the cost of caring for
"a nine year old child today is greater than for caring for a three
year old child six years ago."
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The Appellant introduced absolutely no evidence as to the
increase in caring for Alison.

The Appellant made absolutely no

attempt to demonstrate what her costs were in 1987. The Appellant
made no effort to demonstrate the extent to which these costs had
increased.

The Appellant made absolutely no attempt to introduce

evidence of any new costs.

The Appellant failed to produce any

evidence as to increases in her own debts and living expenses.
This evidence would have had a bearing on whether the Appellant had
less (or perhaps more) money available to provide for the minor
child.
It may or may not be that if the Appellant had produced
evidence that supported her contention that the cost of caring for
the parties' minor child had increased, such evidence would have
been sufficient to rebut the presumption that a material change in
circumstance exists where there is a 25% difference between the
existing order and the Guideline amount.

What is certain is that

the Appellant cannot claim that the trial court erred in failing to
make the increase in child support retroactive to April of 1991
when the Appellant made absolutely no effort to introduce any
evidence to rebut the presumption and show that the application of
the Guidelines would be unfair, unjust and/or not in the child's
best interest.
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II.

The Trial Court Properly Found That There Was No Substantial
Change In Circumstances To Modify The Decree of Divorce So As
To Switch The Dependency Deduction From The Appellee To The
Appellant.
As is set forth in Paragraph 1, 2, 3, 6 and 9 of the Findings

of Fact, when the parties were divorced in 1986, the Appellee was
a college student.

The Appellant was working full time.

At the

time the Decree was entered, the parties anticipated that in 1990
the Appellee would have graduated from college and would be earning
more than the Appellant, and would have greater use for the
dependency exemption.

Based on the circumstance that from 1986

through tax year 1989 the Appellant would be earning more than the
Appellee, and that from 1990 forward the Appellee would be earning
more than the Appellant, and would have a greater use for the
dependency exemption, the Appellant was awarded the exemption
through 1989, after which the Appellee was awarded the parties'
minor child as a dependency exemption.
On or about May 19, 1992, the Appellant filed her Amended
Petition to Modify.

In the Amended Petition to Modify, the

Appellant requested that she be awarded the dependency exemption.
It is not clear from the Amended Petition what substantial changes
in circumstance the Appellant relied upon in requesting that the
dependency exemption be transferred from the Appellee to the
Appellant.

At the hearing on September 3, 1992, the lower court
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made its findings based upon the parties' stipulation.

Based on

those findings, the court concluded that:
"There has not been a substantial change in
circumstances of the parties sufficient to
warrant altering the portion of the existing
decree which awards to plaintiff the right to
claim the minor child of the parties as a
dependent and thus claim an exemption for
income tax purposes." Conclusions of Law, p.
9.
The Appellant claims that the court erred in refusing to
modify the Decree of Divorce so as to transfer the dependency
exemption from the Appellee to the Appellant.

The Appellant's

supporting argument is fraught with factual and legal errors.
These errors will be addressed in the order of their appearance in
the Appellant's brief.
On page 23, the Appellant states:
"Because the trial court recalculated the
parties' child support obligations in light of
changed circumstances, its subsequent decision
must either conform to the guidelines or be
justified by adequate findings. However, the
trial court departed from the guidelines
without justifying the departure."
This statement embodies a number of errors.

First, the

Appellant seems to be suggesting that the change in circumstances
that supported the modification to increase the child support would
also support a modification to switch the dependency exemption from
the Appellant to the Appellee. This suggestion is contrary to the
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decision in Haslam v, Haslam, 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982) where the
Court stated:
"The change in circumstances required to
justify a modification of a divorce decree
varies with the type of modification sought."
Id. at 758.
Unless the circumstances upon which the award of child support
and the dependency exemption were the same, a substantial change in
circumstances upon which a child support award is based would not
serve as a substantial change upon which to base a modification of
the dependency exemption.

In the instant case, the change of

circumstances upon which the modification to increase child support
was based was an increase in the Appellee's income.

As the

circumstance upon which the award of the dependency exemption was
based was that the party with the greater income should receive the
dependency exemption, an increase in the Appellee's income would
not be a substantial change of circumstances upon which to modify
the dependency exemption.
The Appellant's second error (and an error that is repeated on
numerous occasions throughout the Appellant's brief) is that the
court did not make adequate findings as to why its decision did not
conform to the Guidelines.

The Appellant seems to be suggesting

that the court's decision whether or not to modify

the tax

dependency exemption must be done in accordance with the Child
Support Guidelines.

The Appellant
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ignores the

long-standing

holdings too numerous to count that stand for the unwavering
standard

that

a decree

is to be modified

when

there

is a

substantial change in circumstances upon which the award is based.
As there has been no change in the circumstances upon which the
divorce court awarded the tax dependency exemption, the Child
Support Guidelines do not bear on the issue of the tax dependency
exemption.
The third error is the Appellant's complaint as to the court's
lack of findings.

As has been set forth above, the findings

carefully detailed the parties7 circumstances that existed at the
time of the Decree of Divorce, what the parties anticipated what
would happen in 1990, the reason why the dependency exemption was
switched from the Appellant to the Appellee after tax year 1989,
and the parties' present circumstances. Should this Court disagree
with the Appellee and agree with the Appellant and determine that
the trial court did not make adequate findings, the holding in
Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931 (Utah 1979), makes clear that the
Appellant cannot blame the court for omitting any findings of fact
which the Appellant believes the court should have made:
"When, however, a party drafts findings which
are adopted by the court, and includes therein
no mention of a material allegation of fact
raised at trial, such a party may be deemed to
have waived any objection to the failure of
the trial court to make such a finding. Such
a waiver must be considered conclusive upon
appeal.
To rule otherwise would permit a
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party tacitly to omit a material finding of
fact from the proposed findings and then
pursue reversal as a matter of law due to
failure of the trial court to make such a
finding." Id. at 935.
If there is some factual allegation the Appellant claims has
been omitted, the Appellant, who failed to include such a finding
in the Findings of Fact that she drafted, is deemed to have waived
any such objection.
The next error is found in the statement that "importantly,
Utah's Child Support Guidelines assume that the custodial parent is
awarded the tax dependency exemption." Appellant's Brief at p. 23.
While the statement is correct, the Appellant ignores that the
action below was not a suit for divorce.
modification.

This action was a

A modification requires a substantial change in

circumstances.
The Appellant's next error is in its invocation of Fullmer v.
Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988).

In Fullmer, the trial

court had modified the Decree of Divorce so as to (1) switch
custody of the parties' minor child from Mrs. to Mr. Fullmer, and
(2) transfer the dependency exemption from Mrs. to Mr. Fullmer. On
appeal, the Court first determined that the lower court erred in
finding

a

change

modification

in

circumstances

of custody.

upon

which

it

based

the

The next question was whether Mr.

Fullmer, who would then be the non-custodial parent, should still
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be entitled to the dependency exemption.

The Court in Fullmer

determined that as under the IRS Code, the non-custodial parent
could only claim the dependency exemption when the custodial parent
signed a waiver, and as Mrs. Fullmer had not signed such a waiver
and had not been ordered to sign a waiver, Mr. Fullmer could not
claim the minor child.

The reason Mrs. Fullmer was not ordered to

sign a waiver to allow the non-custodial parent to receive the
dependency exemption is that the lower court had made Mr. Fullmer
the custodial parent. In a footnote found on page 24 of her brief,
the Appellant asserts that the Decree of Divorce in the instant
case did not order the Appellant to sign a waiver allowing the
Appellee to claim the dependency exemption.

In making this

assertion, the Appellant hopes that this Court will ignore the
final provision of the Decree of Divorce which states:
"Each party is ordered to duly execute and deliver all documents
necessary to effect the Decree of Divorce." As the IRS Code allows
the non-custodial parent to claim the child as a dependency
exemption when the custodial parent has signed a waiver, and as the
Decree of Divorce grants the Appellee the dependency exemption from
1990 forward, and as the Decree of Divorce orders the parties to
sign whatever documents are necessary to carry out the terms of the
Decree, the Appellant's Fullmer analysis is ill-founded.
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Next, the Appellant states that
"realistically, the custodial parent is often
faced with expenses beyond those which are
contemplated and calculated by the Guidelines
on the basis of income alone." Appellant's
Brief at p. 24.
On page 27, the Appellant states:
"Although
Mr. Blaine's
contribution
to
Alison's support is 76% of the Guideline
total, this number alone cannot prove that Mr.
Blaine provides a majority of the support for
Alison."
In making these statements, the Appellant

is trying to

convince the Court that despite the fact that pursuant to the
Guidelines the Appellant is responsible for 24% of the combined
child support, her actual percentage is greater than that, and
therefore she deserves the dependency exemption.

That may or may

not be; the Appellant had the opportunity to produce such evidence
at trial and failed to do so.
CONCLUSION
The Appellee respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
ruling of the lower court.
DATED this ^OV/)

day of

/V/0/

//

1993.

McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

ry Caston
torneys for Appellee
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ADDENDUM A

30

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

DAVID BLAINE,
Plaintiff,

STATE OF UTAH

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. 86-4900291
PAMELA BRADSHAW (BLAINE) ,
(Hon. Anne Stirba)
Defendant.

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the court
for trial on defendant's Petition to Modify, the Hon. Anne
Stirba, judge presiding, the hearing being held on September
3, 1992 at 9:30 a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and by
and through counsel, Harry Caston, defendant appearing in
person and by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard, the
parties having stipulated to the settlement of several
issues, and then having submitted the remaining matters to
the Court as legal issues, and the Court having on Friday,
October 9, 1992 at 10:00 a.m. discussed with counsel the
contents and terms of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions

. ~ I r t c I:: -~J ared herein and having made some amendments
thereto, based thereo^ ^id fo^: c,c,w£ cause appearing, the
Court hereby makes and enters the following

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties were divorced in 1986 when plaintiff

was a full time college student and his income was less than
eight hundred dollars (<$800.00) per month.

Defendant was

employed full time as a teacher at that time.
2.

Since the divorce the plaintiff has completed his

college education and is now employed full time by IBM in
New York State earning three thousand eighty-one dollars
($3,081.00) per month.
3.

Defendant currently earns one thousand sixty-five

dollars ($1,065.00) per month working half time as a public
school teacher.
4.

The child of the parties was three (3) years old

when the divorce occurred and is now nine (9) years of age.
The cost of caring for a nine year old child today is
greater than for caring for a three year old child six years
ago.
5.

The original decree entered May 2, 1986 provided

that plaintiff would pay a maximum of two hundred and fifty
2
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

DAVID BLAINE,
:
Plaintiff,
VS.

!

PAMELA BRADSHAW (BLAINE),

:

FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 86-4900291
(Hon. Anne Stirba)

Defendant.

:

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the court
for trial on defendant's Petition to Modify, the Hon. Anne
Stirba, judge presiding# the hearing being held on September
3, 1992 at 9:30 a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and by
and through counsel, Harry Caston, defendant appearing in
person and by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard, the
parties having stipulated to the settlement of several
issues, and then having submitted the remaining matters to
the Court as legal issues, based thereon and for good cause
appearing, the Court hereby makes and enters the following

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties were divorced in 1986 when plaintiff

was a full time college student and his income was less than
eight hundred dollars (<$800.00) per month.

Defendant was

employed full time as a teacher at that time.
2.

Since the divorce the plaintiff has completed his

college education and is now employed full time by IBM in
New York State earning three thousand eighty-one dollars
($3,081.00) per month.
3.

Defendant currently earns one thousand sixty-five

dollars ($1,065.00) per month working half time as a public
school teacher.
4.

The child of the parties was three (3) years old

when the divorce occurred and is now nine (9) years of age.
The cost of caring for a nine year old child is substantially greater than for caring for a three year old child.
5.

The original decree entered May 2, 1986 provided

that plaintiff would pay a maximum of two hundred and fifty
dollars ($250.00) per month in child support when his income
exceeded one thousand two hundred and fifty dollars
($1,250.00+) per month.

The original decree had provisions

for escalation of child support as plaintiff's income
increased, but contained no provision for escalation after
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plaintiffs income substantially exceeded one thousand two
hundred and fifty dollars ($1,250.00) per month.
6.

The original decree provided that for the years

1986 - 1989 inclusive the defendant could claim the child as
a dependent and receive an exemption for income tax
purposes.

The original decree and existing order provided

that for the year 1990 and each year thereafter the
plaintiff could claim the child as a dependent and receive
an exemption for income tax purposes. When the decree was
entered the parties anticipated that in 1990 the plaintiff
would be earning more than the defendant and that at that
time he would have greater use for the dependency/exemption
claim of the child.
7.

The original decree made no provision for life

insurance on either parties' life for the benefit of the
child.

The parties stipulated and agreed that the decree

should be modified to require each party to maintain life
insurance coverage on their own life in the sum of at least
one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) naming the minor
child as beneficiary during her minority naming the other
party as trustee of those proceeds.
8.

Plaintiff was served with the petition for

modification on April 22, 1991.
3

9.

In April, 1991 plaintiff was earning only two

thousand eight hundred fifty-two dollars ($2,852.00) gross
monthly salary working for IBM.

In April, 1991 defendant

was earning one thousand eight hundred seventy-three dollars
($1,873.00) gross per month working full-time as a school
teacher.
10.

Under the statutory support guidelines, in April,

1991, plaintiff's child support obligation to the defendant,
if then re-calculated, would have been two hundred ninetyfive dollars ($295.00) per month.

Said sum represents less

than a twenty-five percent (<25%) increase in plaintiff's
support obligation under the guidelines from the existing
court order ($250.00) in effect in April 1991.
11.

On or about October 15, 1991, the plaintiff

received an increase in his monthly gross income and since
that date has been earning three thousand eighty-one dollars
($3,081.00) gross per month.
12.

Plaintiff- has accumulated arrears ($2,350.00) in

child support based upon his non-payment between August,
1989 and December 1991 inclusive, of the full amount ($250.)
as required by the decree.

That amount ($2,350.00) should

be off-set against the equitable lien ($2,217.00) plaintiff
had against the former marital home of the parties. Thus,
4

there is a net balance due defendant from plaintiff for the
sum of one hundred thirty-three dollars ($133.) representing
the accumulated arrears less the equitable lien.

The

plaintiffs equitable lien should be extinguished.
Plaintiff no longer has any claim or interest in the real
property known as:
Lots 1 and 2, Block 2, HOMESITE
ADDITION, according to the official plat
thereof, recorded in Bpok MF" of Plats
at page 101 of the records of the Salt
Lake County Recorder, State of Utah,
located in Salt Lake County, Utah and commonly known as:
555 East 2700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106.
Defendant should be granted a judgment against plaintiff in
the sum of one hundred thirty-three ($133.00) dollars. With
that judgment plaintiff's child support obligation through
and including August, 1992 as provided for under the
original decree has been satisfied.
13.

Defendant claimed in her Petition to Modify that

there was a substantial change in circumstances which
allowed the Court to reconsider and increase child support
as well as to allow the court to re-consider and modify the
decree with regard to which parent could claim the child as
a dependent for income tax purposes.

The parties agreed

that there was a substantial change in circumstances which
allowed the Court to reconsider and increase child support.
5

14.

Other than the foregoing, defendant presented no

evidence to show a change in circumstances of the parties or
to justify increasing child support or altering the award of
the tax dependency exemption allowance.
15.

The parties stipulated that all of the foregoing

facts were true and correct for the purpose of settlement
and for the purpose of presentation to the Court of various
pending legal issues as raised by the pleadings on file.
16.

The defendant incurred court costs in the pursuit

of her petition to modify.

BASED UPON THE FOREGOING and for good cause appearing,
the Court makes and enters the following

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court has subject matter jurisdiction and

personal jurisdiction over the parties.
2.

The plaintiff's child support obligation should be

increased in light of a legally sufficient substantial
change in circumstances set forth in the findings of fact.
3.

The substantial change in circumstances of the

parties set forth above justifies modification of
plaintiff's child support obligation.
6

Under the statutory

guidelines based upon the parties7 current incomes and
incomes as of October 15, 1991, plaintiff's child support
obligation has increased by more than twenty-five per cent
(>25%) over his obligation provided in the existing order.
Pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended)
in light of that twenty-five percent (>25%) increase, the
plaintiff's child support obligation should be increased to
the sum of three hundred twenty-two dollars ($322.00) per
month.
4.

The increased child support set forth in the

foregoing paragraphs is in conformance with and is based
upon the statutory guidelines, Ut. Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14
(1953 as amended) . The sum of three hundred and twenty-two
dollars ($322.00) per month is the exact amount provided
under said guidelines.

Under the guidelines said sum

($322.00) represents seventy-six (76%) of the necessary
support amount established by the guidelines based upon the
combined incomes of the parties.
5.

Because the increase in plaintiff's salary to three

thousand eighty-one dollars ($3,081.00) gross per month
occurred on October 15, 1991, the increase in plaintiff's
child support obligation should be retroactive, pursuant to
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Ut. Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (2) (1953 as amended), only to
October 15, 1991.
6.

The child support shall not be retroactive to when

the plaintiff was served with the Petition for Modification
(April 22, 1991) because as of that date based upon the
parties' respective incomes at that time the increase in
child support under the guidelines was less than one hundred
twenty-five percent (<125%) of plaintiff's support
obligation under the existing order.

A substantial change

of circumstances for the purpose of increasing child support
does not occur unless there is an increase of at least
twenty-five percent (25%) from the existing court ordered
amount to the proposed new increased amount of support.
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended).

Ut.

Based upon the

foregoing, the increase in child support should not be
retroactive to April 22, 1991, but only to October 15, 1991.
7.

Plaintiff owes to defendant ten (10) months at

$72.00 per month (November, 1991 - through August, 1992
inclusive) plus $36.00 for one/half of the month of October,
1991 for a total of seven hundred fifty-six dollars
($756.00) as a result of the retroactive effect of the child
support increase.

Defendant should be granted a judgment

for that amount against plaintiff.
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8.

There has not been a substantial change in circum-

stances of the parties sufficient to warrant altering the
portion of the existing decree which awards to plaintiff the
right to claim the minor child of the parties as a dependent
and thus claim an exemption for income tax purposes.
9.

Under Motes v. Motes, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 at 55,

786 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) and Allred v. Allred, 188
Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (Utah Ct. App. June, 1992) a non-custodial
parent is not required to pay support above the guideline
amounts in order for the non-custodial parent to be awarded
the right to claim a minor child as a dependent for income
tax purposes.

The holdings in those cases with regard to

the award of the exemption/dependency allowance between
parties apply to the award in the initial decree.

When

there is a change in the circumstances identified in Motes
and Allredf there may be a modification of the Decree of
Divorce with regard to award of the right to claim a child
as a dependent for tax purposes.
10.

Based upon the stipulation of the parties, each

party should be ordered to secure and maintain one hundred
thousand dollars ($100,000.00) in life insurance on their
respective lives, naming the minor child as the beneficiary
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during her minority naming the other party as trustee of
those proceeds.
11.

Plaintiff's accumulated arrears ($2,350.00) in

child support should be off-set against the equitable lien
($2,217.00) plaintiff has against the former marital home of
the parties.

Thus, there is a net balance due defendant

from plaintiff for the sum of one hundred thirty-three
dollars ($133.00) representing the difference between the
accumulated arrears and plaintiff's equitable lien.
Plaintiff's equitable lien should be extinguished.
Plaintiff shall no longer have any lien, claim or interest
in the real property known as:
Lots 1 and 2, Block 2, HOMESITE ADDITION, according to the official plat
thereof, recorded in Book ,fFM, of Plats
at page 101, records of the Salt Lake
County Recorder, State of Utah,
located in Salt Lake County, Utah and commonly known as:
555 East 2700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106.
Defendant should be granted a judgment against plaintiff in
the net sum of one hundred thirty-three ($133.00) dollars,
thereupon plaintiff's child support obligation through and
including August, 1992 as provided for under the original
decree will be satisfied.
12.

Defendant is entitled to an award of her costs

pursuant to Rule 54 (d)(1), Ut.R.Civ.Pro.
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13.

An order and judgment should be entered in

conformance with the foregoing findings and conclusions.
DATED this

day of September, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO
FORM & CONTENT:

ANNE STIRBA
JUDGE

HARRY CASTON
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a correct
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW to:
HARRY CASTON
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
on the 15TH day of September, 1992, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
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